The Office of Inspector General (OIG) located withing each major agency, is responsible for protecting programs administered by their respective agencies. Their primary mission is to prevent waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement by employees and contractors. OIG offices conduct audits and investigations to identify internal and external problems, recover funds and tax dollars and to prevent fraud.
Eddie Saffarinia was an Assistant Inspector General for HUD (the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development) from February 2012 to September 2017 where for a time he was the Assistant OIG for Information Technology and later served as the Assistant OIG for Management and Technology. But he also served as HUD-OIG's Head of Contracting Activity which meant that he was responsible for awarding contracts. That would be an obvious internal control weakness and one that is surprising an OIG organization would allow - Mr. Saffarinia was responsible for overseeing himself, his own work - overseeing the contracts that he participated in awarding - ensuring that there was no fraud, waste or abuse going on in the OIG's contracting activities he was involved in.
In his position as head of contracting and as a senior manager supervising HUD-OIG procurements, Mr. Saffarinia oversaw procurement review and approval processes, had access to contractor proposal information and source selection information, and participated personally and substantially in procurements. Therefore, Mr. Saffarinia had a legal duty under government regulations to disclose actual and potential conflicts of interest and to not solicit and accept anything of monetary value from (i) anyone who is seeking to obtain government business, (ii) conducts activities that are regulated by the OIG and (iii) has interest that may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of his official duties.
You can probably guess where this is going. In a 19 page indictment filed int he U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia yesterday, Mr. Saffarinia has been charged with all kinds of financial shenanigans - exchanging proprietary contractor and source selection information for money and directing prime contractors to utilize specific subcontractors and hire specific individuals in exchange for money. The various schemes involved Mr. Saffarinia and two other individuals who emigrated from the same country, went to college together and socialized with each other on a regular basis.
Well, as the Justice Department likes to point out, these indictments are merely allegations at this point. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. Based on the evidence presented in the indictment (bank records, emails and other documents), the Government has a seemingly strong case.
A discussion on what's new and trending in Government contracting circles
Friday, June 28, 2019
Why Do They Let the Fox Guard the Hen-house?
Thursday, June 27, 2019
NDAA 2020 - Government's Use of Firm Fixed Price Contracts
The Senate version of the 2020 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) is calling for two studies of the Defense Department's use of fixed-price contracts, one by DoD and the other by GAO (General Accountability Office).
The DoD's review will focus on how the Department informs decisions to use fixed-price contracts to support broader acquisition objectives, to ensure that such decisions are made strategically and consistently. It is to include decisions on the use of the various types of fixed price contracts, including fixed-price incentive contracts.
The GAO review is similar in scope. It will focus on (i) a description of the extent to which fixed-price contracts have been used over time and the conditions in which they are used, (ii) an assessment of the effects of the decisions to use of fixed-price contract types, such as any additional costs or savings or efficiencies in contract administration, and (iii) an assessment of how decisions to use various types of fixed-price contracts affects the contract closeout process.
To understand why the Senate is calling for these studies, one needs to go back to Section 830 of the FY 2017 NDAA. That provision, which has been enacted into law, requires the Defense Department to use firm fixed-price contracts for foreign military sales (FMS). There are several reasons why the Government likes fixed price contracts:
The Government's push (and preference) for fixed price contracting may have resulted in situations where contractors are losing too much money. Some acquisitions are not well suited for fixed price contracting (such as developmental programs) and the Government's propensity for fixed price contracts has had undesired consequences.
The DoD's review will focus on how the Department informs decisions to use fixed-price contracts to support broader acquisition objectives, to ensure that such decisions are made strategically and consistently. It is to include decisions on the use of the various types of fixed price contracts, including fixed-price incentive contracts.
The GAO review is similar in scope. It will focus on (i) a description of the extent to which fixed-price contracts have been used over time and the conditions in which they are used, (ii) an assessment of the effects of the decisions to use of fixed-price contract types, such as any additional costs or savings or efficiencies in contract administration, and (iii) an assessment of how decisions to use various types of fixed-price contracts affects the contract closeout process.
To understand why the Senate is calling for these studies, one needs to go back to Section 830 of the FY 2017 NDAA. That provision, which has been enacted into law, requires the Defense Department to use firm fixed-price contracts for foreign military sales (FMS). There are several reasons why the Government likes fixed price contracts:
- Fixed price contracts provide greater incentive than cost-reimbursement contracts for the contractor to control costs and perform efficiently
- Fixed price contracts shifts risk from the Government to the contractor
- Fixed price contracts reduce administrative costs
The Government's push (and preference) for fixed price contracting may have resulted in situations where contractors are losing too much money. Some acquisitions are not well suited for fixed price contracting (such as developmental programs) and the Government's propensity for fixed price contracts has had undesired consequences.
Wednesday, June 26, 2019
Federal Government Surpasses it Small Business Contracting Goals for Fiscal Year 2018
The SBA (Small Business Administration) announced yesterday that the Federal Government achieved its small business contracting goals for the sixth consecutive year. The Federal Government overall, awarded more than 25 percent of Federal contract dollars to small businesses. This percentage equates to about $121 billion or about $15 billion more than fiscal year 2017.
Comparing fiscal year 2018 performance with that of 2017, awards to small businesses were up in all categories. The only category where the Federal Government fell short of its goal was awards to Women Owned Small Businesses. So there's an opportunity there for women-owned small businesses.
Here is a summary of achievements by category:
SBA tracked performance on 23 different Agencies including themselves. 19 of those Agencies received a score of 'A' or 'A+'. Three Agencies received a 'B' grade (AID, HHS, and OPM) and one received a 'C' grade (NFS).
Comparing fiscal year 2018 performance with that of 2017, awards to small businesses were up in all categories. The only category where the Federal Government fell short of its goal was awards to Women Owned Small Businesses. So there's an opportunity there for women-owned small businesses.
Here is a summary of achievements by category:
SBA tracked performance on 23 different Agencies including themselves. 19 of those Agencies received a score of 'A' or 'A+'. Three Agencies received a 'B' grade (AID, HHS, and OPM) and one received a 'C' grade (NFS).
Tuesday, June 25, 2019
NDAA 2020 - Cost or Pricing Data Required to Support Commercial Pricing
Well its that time of the year when we begin to follow the NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) process. Both the Senate and House have their own versions of the bill. After they pass them in their respective bodies, it goes to a compromise committee comprised of both Senate and House members, voted on by both and eventually to the President's desk for signature. Not all provisions will survive. Some will be eliminated. Others will be watered down. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see what legislators are thinking about when it comes to contracting matters. We will be covering various NDAA 2020 provisions periodically from now until it becomes law.
Today we begin with Section 803 appearing in the House version.
Is the Government getting hosed on commercial item purchases? Many people think so and can point to anecdotal evidence of that happening. In theory, buying commercial products makes sense and can save a lot of time and money. But the FAR definition of "commercial item" is quite broad (see FAR 2.101) and the product or service doesn't even need to be actually sold to the general public - it only needs to have been offered for sale to the general public.
Last year, GAO issued a report concluding that DoD's process for determining whether an item can be purchased commercially - and at a fair and reasonable price - is often long and challenging. One of its findings is that DoD was unable to obtain contractor data when adequate market information was not available. Ultimately, contracting officers need to determine that a price is fair and reasonable to the Government, irrespective of how the product or service was priced.
Section 803 attempts to deal with that problem by requiring contractors proposing commercial items to also provide cost or pricing data to the contracting officer when, based on market research, that item will be solely procured by DoD. (This begs the question that if an item is only procured by DoD, how can it be a commercial item?)
If an offeror fails to comply with the requirement, the Secretary of Defense may suspend or debar such offeror or include a notation on such offeror in the system used by the Federal Government to monitor or record contractor past performance.
So commercial item contractors may be requested to furnish cost or pricing data or face being written up in the past performance rating system.
Another element to Section 803 is the threat of a should-cost review before DoD enters into a contract to procure such a commercial product.
The Director of DCMA shall identify which commercial products should be analyzed under the should-cost review process before the Secretary of Defense enters into a contract to procure such a commercial product. Read about 'should-cost' reviews here.
Today we begin with Section 803 appearing in the House version.
Is the Government getting hosed on commercial item purchases? Many people think so and can point to anecdotal evidence of that happening. In theory, buying commercial products makes sense and can save a lot of time and money. But the FAR definition of "commercial item" is quite broad (see FAR 2.101) and the product or service doesn't even need to be actually sold to the general public - it only needs to have been offered for sale to the general public.
Last year, GAO issued a report concluding that DoD's process for determining whether an item can be purchased commercially - and at a fair and reasonable price - is often long and challenging. One of its findings is that DoD was unable to obtain contractor data when adequate market information was not available. Ultimately, contracting officers need to determine that a price is fair and reasonable to the Government, irrespective of how the product or service was priced.
Section 803 attempts to deal with that problem by requiring contractors proposing commercial items to also provide cost or pricing data to the contracting officer when, based on market research, that item will be solely procured by DoD. (This begs the question that if an item is only procured by DoD, how can it be a commercial item?)
If an offeror fails to comply with the requirement, the Secretary of Defense may suspend or debar such offeror or include a notation on such offeror in the system used by the Federal Government to monitor or record contractor past performance.
So commercial item contractors may be requested to furnish cost or pricing data or face being written up in the past performance rating system.
Another element to Section 803 is the threat of a should-cost review before DoD enters into a contract to procure such a commercial product.
The Director of DCMA shall identify which commercial products should be analyzed under the should-cost review process before the Secretary of Defense enters into a contract to procure such a commercial product. Read about 'should-cost' reviews here.
Monday, June 24, 2019
What are Undefinitized Contract Actions?
This is an update to previously posted articles on Undefinitized Contract Actions. To read previous posts, see Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs) and Undefinitized Contract Actions? Government May Lower Profit Percentages.
A Government contract is considered 'definitized' where there is agreement on (i) contract terms, (ii) specification, and (iii) price. An undefinitized contract then means any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the contract.
Undefinitized contract actions allow the contractor to begin work before there is a finalized contract in place. However, since undefinitized contract actions represent a risk to the Government, they are to be used only in rare and select circumstances.
Generally, undefinitized contract actions are to be used only when (i) the negotiation of a definitive contract action is not possible in sufficient time to meet the Government's requirements; and (ii) the Government's interest demands that the contract be given a binding commitment so that contract performance can begin immediately.
Contracting officers normally cannot enter into Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs) without higher level approval. UCA agreements must include a not-to-exceed price. This is necessary to ensure there is a limitation to the Government's financial exposure. UCAs must be definitized by the earlier of (i) 180 days (six months) or (ii) the date on which the amount of funds paid to the contractor under the contract action is equal to more than 50 percent of the not-to-exceed price.
UCAs should be rare occurrences but are more common than one would suppose (see GAO report: Observations of Air Force's Use of Undefinitized Contract Actions). Examples where UCAs are utilized include major acquisition programs with long-lead material purchases and where the Government needs to quickly respond to tragedies such as fires, hurricanes, and floods.
The one possible downside to contractors under the UCA process is the potential profit to be made. Sometimes performance is practically completed before the contract can be definitized making a firm-fixed price contract almost a cost-reimbursable contract. The farther down the performance period a contract goes before definitization, the less risk there is to the contractor (in the Government's view) which reduces risk to the contractor and a reduction in the profit percentage.
A Government contract is considered 'definitized' where there is agreement on (i) contract terms, (ii) specification, and (iii) price. An undefinitized contract then means any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the contract.
Undefinitized contract actions allow the contractor to begin work before there is a finalized contract in place. However, since undefinitized contract actions represent a risk to the Government, they are to be used only in rare and select circumstances.
Generally, undefinitized contract actions are to be used only when (i) the negotiation of a definitive contract action is not possible in sufficient time to meet the Government's requirements; and (ii) the Government's interest demands that the contract be given a binding commitment so that contract performance can begin immediately.
Contracting officers normally cannot enter into Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs) without higher level approval. UCA agreements must include a not-to-exceed price. This is necessary to ensure there is a limitation to the Government's financial exposure. UCAs must be definitized by the earlier of (i) 180 days (six months) or (ii) the date on which the amount of funds paid to the contractor under the contract action is equal to more than 50 percent of the not-to-exceed price.
UCAs should be rare occurrences but are more common than one would suppose (see GAO report: Observations of Air Force's Use of Undefinitized Contract Actions). Examples where UCAs are utilized include major acquisition programs with long-lead material purchases and where the Government needs to quickly respond to tragedies such as fires, hurricanes, and floods.
The one possible downside to contractors under the UCA process is the potential profit to be made. Sometimes performance is practically completed before the contract can be definitized making a firm-fixed price contract almost a cost-reimbursable contract. The farther down the performance period a contract goes before definitization, the less risk there is to the contractor (in the Government's view) which reduces risk to the contractor and a reduction in the profit percentage.
Friday, June 21, 2019
Contractor Pays $300 Thousand to Settle False Claims Allegations
A Philadelphia-based company, 'Support of Microcomputers Associates' or SOMA, has agreed to a $300 thousand judgment for selling foreign-sourced computer supplies (i.e. printers and other equipment) to Federal agencies.
For an eight year period, SOMA sold computer supplies and accessories under GSA's (General Services Administration's 'Advantage' program which provides a web-based ordering system for federal agencies. Companies selling under the GSA Advantage program certify that the materials they sell are permitted for sale under the Trade Agreement Act. This Act provide for the United States and its agencies to purchase American-made materials or materials manufactured in specified allied countries. In violation of this Act and contrary to its certification, SOMA offered for sale to Government agencies, printers and other materials manufactured in China, Vietnam, and other non-compliant countries.
The Government's investigation began when a former executive of SOMA filed a qui tam (or whistleblower) action under the False Claims Act. Qui tam provisions permit private parties to sue for false claims on behalf of the Government and to receive a share of any recovery. The former executive will receive a share of the $300 thousand settlement but the Justice Department's press release announcing this settlement did not specify the amount. We guess the amount would be less than $100 thousand from which the executive's attorneys will want their cut.
The $300 thousand settlement was based on (i) SOMA's ability to pay and (ii) the company's cooperation in the investigation. That means there is a good chance that the company sold non-compliant goods for much more than that.
For an eight year period, SOMA sold computer supplies and accessories under GSA's (General Services Administration's 'Advantage' program which provides a web-based ordering system for federal agencies. Companies selling under the GSA Advantage program certify that the materials they sell are permitted for sale under the Trade Agreement Act. This Act provide for the United States and its agencies to purchase American-made materials or materials manufactured in specified allied countries. In violation of this Act and contrary to its certification, SOMA offered for sale to Government agencies, printers and other materials manufactured in China, Vietnam, and other non-compliant countries.
The Government's investigation began when a former executive of SOMA filed a qui tam (or whistleblower) action under the False Claims Act. Qui tam provisions permit private parties to sue for false claims on behalf of the Government and to receive a share of any recovery. The former executive will receive a share of the $300 thousand settlement but the Justice Department's press release announcing this settlement did not specify the amount. We guess the amount would be less than $100 thousand from which the executive's attorneys will want their cut.
The $300 thousand settlement was based on (i) SOMA's ability to pay and (ii) the company's cooperation in the investigation. That means there is a good chance that the company sold non-compliant goods for much more than that.
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